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I. INTRODUCTION
States that choose to elect their judges' must reconcile the conflict between the
needs to preserve judicial neutrality and to maintain public respect for the legal
system, and the political realities of election campaigns. The cornerstone of our
electoral system is open debate during campaigns. The American Bar Association
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA Code), 2 however, allows attorneys
much less latitude for criticism than is allowed laypeople during judicial election
campaigns. 3 The policy requiring lawyers to maintain a higher standard of conduct in
a contest for judicial office than is required by those seeking elected executive or
legislative office is based on the unique characteristics of the judiciary. Ideally, the
judiciary is a neutral body free from partisan political influence. Maintaining public
respect for the laws and the courts is essential to the effective administration of
justice. 4 Thus, any unprofessional conduct by lawyers that lessens public confidence
in the legal system should be avoided. 5 Restricting attorneys' good-faith criticisms of
judicial candidates precludes much of the debate that traditionally is associated with
political campaigns. The ability of judges to respond to criticisms also is restricted by
their duties as members of the bar and bench. Therefore, unlike other candidates for
elected office, judges and judicial candidates are prohibited from engaging in politics
at election time.
The first purpose of this Comment is to review relevant United States Supreme
Court decisions and to discuss how their application to attorney criticism of judges in
judicial campaigns would expand the scope of election debate. The second purpose
is to review the standards that state courts apply in restricting attorney criticism and
the limits they impose on judges' speech rights during judicial election campaigns.
The third purpose of this Comment is to illustrate how overly restrictive standards
infringe on the free speech rights of attorneys and judges. Finally, this Comment will
propose a standard for speech that is less restrictive and maximizes the flow of
information to voters during election campaigns.
1. As of 1984, 24 states elect their state court judges, 11 states appoint all their judges, and 15 states use various
mixed selection systems whereby judges are appointed and after a designated time must run for reelection. Am. JuR. 2D
DESK BooK, Item No. 76 (Supp. 1985). This Comment does not advocate any particular manner of state court judge
selection. It is intended only to propose a standard of speech in judicial election campaigns for states that have chosen to
elect their state court judges.
2. MODEL CODE or PROESSIONAL REspos\stnn (1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA CoDE].
3. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
4. ABA ConE, supra note 2, EC 1-1, EC 1-5.
5. Id. DR 1-101 ("Maintaining Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession").
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II. BASIC FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS IN THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
The first amendment prohibits Congress from making laws that abridge free
speech. 6 Problems arise, however, in defining free speech. Libel and defamation,7
fighting words, 8 obscenity, 9 and false statements10 are not protected speech. Speech
that clearly does not belong in one of these established unprotected categories
receives varying degrees of constitutional protection. 1' Courts generally consider the
importance of the communication1 2 and the context of the communication13 in
determining the degree of protection that certain speech should receive. The United
States Supreme Court has been especially skeptical of restrictions on speech that are
aimed at suppressing the content of the communication.1 4 A content-based restriction
seeks to regulate what people may say rather than where or when they may speak. 15
Content-based restrictions, therefore, receive a high level of judicial scrutiny and will
be upheld only if they are narrowly drawn to achieve "an important or substantial
governmental interest [that] . . .is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion."1 6 In the context of attorney speech, content-based restrictions occur when
attorneys are sanctioned for political comment in election campaigns.
Professional associations may limit further the free speech rights of their
members to preserve the integrity of the particular profession.' 7 The manner in which
the legal profession restricts the speech of its members is set forth in the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Adopted in 1970, the CPR replaced the former
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.' 8 The present Code consists of nine canons
covering various subjects, including professional integrity, competence, misconduct,
improving the legal system, improper influence, respect toward the courts, and
6. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law . . .abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances." Id. The rights of freedom of speech and press apply to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
7. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 268 & n.6 (1964); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
8. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
9. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
10. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
11. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964).
12. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 56, 61 (1976).
13. See FCC v. Pacifiea Found., 438 U.S. 726,748-50 (1978) (offensive speech broadcaston public airwaves may
be banned because such speech is uniquely accessible to children). Although a total ban on offensive communication may
be unconstitutional, offensive speech may be subject to greater restrictions when the Court feels it makes little contribution
to the marketplace of ideas. Id. at 745-47.
14. Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (statute prohibiting advertisement of prescription drug prices
struck down as content-based restriction); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (statute prohibiting advocacy of
criminal syndicalism struck down as content-based restriction).
15. Compare Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (statute that makes distinctions based on the content of the
speech is presumptively invalid) with Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (statute that addresses considerations
of time, place, and manner only to conserve public convenience is presumptively valid).
16. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
17. Note, Restrictions on Attorney Criticism of the Judiciary: A Denial of First Amendment Rights. 56 Nomn Dms
LAw. 489, 496 (1981).
18. T. SwisH-t, PSOrAmitoN. RFsposmary mr Omo 1.39 (1981).
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avoiding impropriety.' 9 The Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC),20 adopted in 1972,
replaced the former Canons of Judicial Ethics. 2' The CJC specifically governs
judicial duties and restrictions on judges' activities. It contains seven canons covering
a variety of topics including the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, avoiding
impropriety, and political activity. 22
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility imposes duties and
restrictions on members of the legal profession through ethical considerations (EC's)
and disciplinary rules (DR's). 23 The EC's are aspirational, but the DR's outline the
minimum requirements of professional behavior24 and may be enforced by repri-
mand, 25 suspension,26 or disbarment. 27
The rules governing attorneys' speech during judicial election campaigns are
covered in Canon 8 of the ABA Code. 28 The Code imposes conflicting duties on
attorneys by encouraging them to "protest earnestly against the... election of those
who are unsuited for the bench," 29 while requiring them to "be certain of the merit
of [their] complaint[s], use appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms, for
unrestrained and intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in our legal
system." ' 30 The purposes of the restrictions are to maintain respect for the legal
system3' and to protect judges who cannot fully defend themselves. 32
Canon 7 of the CJC governs the political activity of judges and candidates for
election. 33 Canon 7(B)(1)(c), which governs campaign conduct, is the section of the
CJC most restrictive of speech, stating that a judicial candidate "should not make
pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or
political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position or other
fact.'' 34 The purpose of the restrictions on campaign activities is to protect and
19. See ABA CoDE, supra note 2.
20. CODE OF IU:aD . Co.Ducr (1984) [hereinafter cited as CJC].
21. Id. (Preface).
22. See CJC, supra note 20.
23. ABA CoD, supra note 2 (Preliminary Statement). Similarly, the CJC outlines the ethical responsibilities of
members of the judiciary.
24. Id.
25. See In re Baker, 218 Kan. 209, 542 P.2d 701 (1975); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Riebel, 69 Ohio St. 2d 290, 432
N.E.2d 165 (1982); In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191, 75 N.W.2d 644 (1956).
26. See Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Harris, I Ohio St. 3d 33, 437 N.E.2d 596 (1982); In re Troy, 43 R.I. 279, 111
A. 723 (1920); Board of Law Examiners v. Spriggs, 61 Wyo. 70, 155 P.2d 285, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 886 (1945).
27. See Thatcher v. United States, 212 F. 801 (6th Cir. 1914), reh'g denied, 219 F. 173 (6th Cir. 1915), appeal
dismissed, 241 U.S. 644 (1916); State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1958); State v. Nelson, 551 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977).
28. ABA COD, supra note 2, EC 8-6.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. EC 8-1.
32. Id. EC 8-6.
33. CJC, supra note 20, Canon 7.
34. Id. Canon 7(B).
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preserve the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary. 35 States that apply these
standards assume that there is a greater need to insulate judges from criticism than
other officials. 36 It is not clear why judges are considered more vulnerable to criticism
than other professionals, yet this proposition is relied on to justify the restrictions on
attorneys' speech. 37
The proposition that criticisms of attorneys and judges by attorneys and judges
will unduly influence the public and degrade the legal system assumes that
nonlawyers are politically immature and unable to accept the opinions of profession-
als for what they are worth and to reach their own conclusions. 38 The proposition also
assumes that the public's confidence in the legal system is too fragile to withstand
good-faith criticism by its members. However, requiring attorneys to refrain from
comment unless they are convinced to a factual certainty of the merit of their
complaints implicitly requires them to refrain from criticism in many situations. In
other contexts, it has been recognized repeatedly that "erroneous statements are
inevitable in free debate. '" 39 The danger of requiring attorneys to be sure their
criticisms are true is that
would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether
it can be proved in court or... [t]hey [may] tend to make only statements which "steer
far wider of the unlawful zone. "40
The United States Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan4l adopted
a standard that, if applied to attorney speech, would avoid undue restrictions on
comment during elections. In New York Times, the Court set forth a test for libel that
is designed to allow the greatest amount of comment regarding the activities of public
officials while also protecting them from malicious attacks. 42 To avoid undue state
restrictions on speech, the New York Times rule limits the state's power to impose
liability for criticism of the conduct of public officials to statements "made with
35. Id. Canon 1 ("A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary."); Morial v. Judiciary
Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 302(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978) (restrictions on judges' first amendment
rights must be reasonably necessary to protect judicial integrity); In re Bonin, 375 Mass. 680, 693, 378 N.E.2d 669, 676
(1978) (a judge must avoid even the appearance of impropriety).
36. State ex rel. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications v. Rome, 229 Kan. 195, 623 P.2d 1307 (1981).
37. Id See also Chapman, Criticism-A Lawyer's Duty or Downfall?, 1981 S. lIL. U.L.J. 437.
38. In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191, 199-200,75 N.W.2d 644, 649 (1956). See also infra text accompanying note 109.
39. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
40. Id. at 279 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). The court in New York Times stated:
Where judicial officers are involved, this Court has held that concern for the dignity and reputation of the courts
does not justify the punishment as criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision. . . .Such
repression can be justified, if at all, only by a clear and present danger of the obstruction of justice. ... If
judges are to be treated "as men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate," . . . surely the same must be
true of other government officials ....
Id. at 272-73 (quoting Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)). This chilling effect on attorney speech is enhanced
by the vagueness of the ABA Code. See generally Note, Lawyer Disciplinary Standards: Broad vs. Narrow Proscriptions,
65 IowA L. RFv. 1386 (1980); Note, Disbarment: A Case for Reform, 17 N.Y.L.F. 792 (1971); Comment, ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility: Voidfor Vagueness?, 57 N.C.L. Rev. 671 (1979).
41. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
42. Id. at 279-80.
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'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not."43
Applying the New York Times rule to public criticisms of attorneys and judges
would protect criticisms made in good faith. If attorneys negligently make false
statements, they will be protected from sanctions. If they intentionally or recklessly
make false statements, however, their speech will not be protected."4 This standard
allows attorneys and judges the same free speech rights as other citizens and should
be applied to statements about the public activities of attorneys and judges in judicial
election campaigns.
Application of the New York Times standard is justified because the need for
open debate in an election campaign requires greater protection of attorney speech
than may be sufficient in other contexts. 45 The public has a right to receive as much
information as possible to make an educated choice. Because an informed electorate
is crucial to an effective political process, states that elect their judges must recognize
that people need information about the candidates if the election is to be more than
a popularity contest.46
It is not disputed that the state has a significant interest in assuring that its elected
judges are protected from malicious criticism and that judicial campaigns are run in
a manner that preserves the integrity of state judges and the bar.47 These interests,
however, must be served through means that are not overly restrictive of attorney
speech.
Hm. APPLICATION OF ETHIcAL STANDARDS TO SPEECH BY JUDGES AND ATToRNEYs
A. United States Supreme Court Decisions on the Right to Criticize Judges
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed directly the issue of the free
speech rights of attorneys in judicial election campaigns. However, the Court has
ruled on the rights of the press4s and other public officials49 to criticize judges,50 their
rulings,5 ' and the law52 during trials 53 and election campaigns. 54 In several cases, the
Court has reversed state supreme court decisions upholding convictions for criticism
of judges. In Bridges v. California,S5 Pennekamp v. Florida,5 6 and Wood v.
Georgia,57 the Court required the state to show that a clear and present danger to the
43. Id.
44. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 77-81.
46. In re Baker, 218 Kan. 209, 213, 542 P.2d 701, 705 (1975).
47. Berger v. Supreme Court, 598 F. Supp. 69, 75 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
48. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
49. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (a sheriff).
50. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
51. See id.
52. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959) (criticism of Smith Act cases).
53. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
54. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
55. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
56. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
57. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
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administration of justice was extremely likely to result from the speech the state
attempted to restrict.58 The clear and present danger test as applied to threats to the
administration of justice is "a working principle that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can
be punished.'59
1. Bridges v. California and Pennekamp v. Florida
In Bridges v. California,6° the Court reversed contempt convictions of a
newspaper editor and a labor leader for their remarks in editorials commenting on
cases pending in a state court. The Court held the convictions violated the first
amendment. 61 The substantive evils asserted by the state in support of the contempt
convictions were disrespect for the judiciary and disorderly and unfair administration
of justice. 62 The Court responded:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from
published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion. For it is
a prized American privilege to speak one's mind ... on all public institutions. And an
enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the
bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it
would enhance respect.63
In Pennekamp v. Florida,6a the state instituted a similar contempt proceeding
against a newspaper, charging that its publication of two editorials and a cartoon
criticizing a Florida trial court impugned the integrity of, and tended to create a
distrust for, the court. 65 The Court again reversed the conviction as violating the first
amendment. 66 In Pennekamp, the Court accepted the state supreme court finding that
the editorials and cartoons in question were a wanton withholding of the full truth. 67
However, the publications were found to be legitimate criticism that created no clear
and present danger to the administration of justice. 68
Pennekamp was decided before New York Times, but the Court adopted an
analogous standard. The criticism, although untrue, was protected by the first
amendment because "[in the borderline instances ... , we think the specific
58. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348 (1946); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1941). Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speech advocating criminal
syndicalism); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (speech intended to obstruct the draft).
59. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). But see In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 618-23, 449 A.2d 483,
491-94 (1982) (a recent rejection of the clear and present danger test as applied to threats to the administration ofjustice).
60. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
61. Id. at 273-75. Contempt proceedings, like disciplinary actions, are subject to constitutional scrutiny because
the judiciary often is reviewing the acts of its own members without checks by the the executive or legislative branches.
In addition, in order to prosecute for contempt, an actual obstruction to the administration of justice must exist. Nye v.
United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48-50 (1941).
62. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941).
63. Id. at 270-71.
64. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
65. Id. at 339.
66. Id. at 346-50.
67. Id. at 341, 345.
68. Id. at 347-48.
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freedom of public comment should weigh heavily against a possible tendency to
influence pending cases." 69 This is especially true during an election campaign
where the value of good-faith criticism adds to public discussion of campaign issues.
There is a qualitative difference between first amendment rights in the context
of a trial, as addressed in Pennekamp, and in an election campaign. In election
campaigns, restrictions on speech are designed to protect the speakers and the
integrity of the judicial system. During a trial, additional interests must be protected,
and the danger of allowing unfettered discussion is more immediate. First amendment
considerations during a trial must take account of not only the rights of the speaker
and the public, but also of the defendant's constitutional rights. The right of a
defendant to a fair trial may outweigh free speech rights of attorneys in the context
of a trial. Since the election context lacks this factor, free speech during election
campaigns should be more open than during trials.
In Pennekamp, the comments in issue were directed at elected judges and made
reference to their handling of pending cases. The state suggested that the judges'
neutrality might be affected by a desire to maintain public esteem and secure
reelection at the cost of unfair rulings. 70 The Court refused to accept this debatable
and remote harm based on a questionable assumption about the independence and
fortitude of judges. 71 The Court stated that comments made about the judges would
affect various judges differently. Some judges would not be affected at all by
unpleasant criticism. The law cannot base an external standard on the varying degrees
of moral courage of individual judges. 72
2. Wood v. Georgia
In Bridges and Pennekamp, the free speech rights of the press to criticize judges
outweighed the states' articulated but unproved interests in protecting the indepen-
dence and neutrality of the judiciary and the fair and impartial administration of justice.
The scope of first amendment freedom granted to the press has traditionally been
greater than that allowed other speakers. 73 Therefore, the freedom of attorneys to
comment on judicial action may not receive the same amount of "first amendment
breathing space" as the press receives. 74 However, considered along with the standard
applied by the Court in Wood v. Georgia,75 Bridges and Pennekamp reveal some
guidelines from which the rights of attorneys may be formed. In Wood, the Court
applied the clear and present danger test set out in Bridges to the statements of a
sheriff.76 Therefore, the mere fact that the press may receive greater first amendment
protection than individuals does not appear to control the outcome of the case.
69. Id. at 347.
70. Id. at 349.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 348.
73. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
74. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
75. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
76. Id. at 391-93.
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In Wood, an elected sheriff was convicted of contempt for criticizing a judge's
instructions to a grand jury in the midst of a local election campaign.77 Both the judge
and the sheriff were candidates for reelection. 78 The Court reversed the conviction
because there was no evidence that the news release actually obstructed the grand jury
in any way. The conviction, therefore, violated Wood's right to freedom of speech
because the state failed to show a clear and present danger to the administration of
justice. 79 The Court also commented on the danger of restricting discussion and
debate on important political issues during an election campaign.80 The conviction
restricted speech at the precise time when public interest and the need to inform the
public of the matters discussed were at their height. 81
3. Application of the New York Times Standard to Attorney Criticism of Judges
The United States Supreme Court has applied the New York Times malice
standard82 to attorney criticism of judges.8 3 The conviction of a district attorney for
accusing state court judges of laziness, inefficiency, and hampering his efforts to
enforce the vice laws was reversed in Garrison v. Louisiana.84 The Court held that
the libel conviction of an attorney for criticism of official conduct of public officials
violated the attorney's first amendment speech rights absent a showing that the
statement was knowingly false or reckless. 85 The Court found a difference between an
honest belief in an inaccurate statement and a deliberate lie; good-faith statements
may contribute to public discussion, whereas conscious falsehoods do not serve to
promote the exposition of ideas in any way. 86 Therefore, the attorney's criticism, 87
however caustic and unpleasant, did not lose its constitutional protection unless the
state could prove it was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard
for the truth. The Garrison decision dealt with the first amendment protection of an
attorney for good-faith criticism of a judge outside the election campaign context.
Since the case for providing constitutional protection for good-faith criticism is even
stronger in the context of an election campaign, 88 the protection afforded attorney
speech in Garrison certainly should apply in the judicial campaign setting.89
77. After the judge, in the presence of the news media, instructed the grand jury to investigate Negro bloc voting
in the county, Sheriff Wood published a letter in the local newspaper in which he "urged the citizenry to take notice when
their highest judicial officers threatened political intimidation and persecution of voters . . . under the guise of law
enforcement." Id. at 379.
78. Id. at 381-82.
79. Id. at 388-89.
80. Id. at 392-93.
81. Id. at 392.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
83. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76 (1964).
84. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
85. Id. at 74-75.
86. Id. at 75.
87. In a published statement issued at a press conference during which he criticized the judges, Garrison asserted,
"This raises interesting questions about the racketeer influences on our eight vacation-minded judges." Id. at 66.
88. See infra p. 7.
89. See infra note 94 for cases in which the courts failed to recognize this seemingly obvious proposition.
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The Court in Garrison allowed attacks on the official conduct of the judges. It
held the attacks were protected by the public-official rule so as to preserve "the
paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning
public officials[;] . . . anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office
is relevant.' 90 There is no mention in the case of the danger of lessening the public's
confidence in the judiciary, or of interfering with just or neutral rulings by the judges.
The Court simply stated that in this context the value of allowing free speech on
issues of public concern can only be restricted if the speech was made with malice.9 1
That is, "[p]ersons who make derogatory statements about judges are protected by
the first and fourteenth amendments from imposition of civil and criminal liability,
unless the statement is made 'with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." '92 State courts, however, often apply a
higher standard to attorney criticism of the judiciary. The ABA Code prohibits an
attorney only from making statements with knowledge of their falsity, 93 but attorneys
have repeatedly been sanctioned for statements which they in good faith believed to
be true.94
Absent the professional standards imposed on attorneys and judges by the ABA
Code, the New York Times libel standard applied in Garrison would provide judges
protection against attorneys who maliciously attack them. However, despite the
holding in Garrison, applications of the ABA Code indicate that many states feel
higher standards of professional conduct and greater restrictions on freedom of speech
should be required during election campaigns to promote public confidence in the
legal system and to protect judicial integrity. 95 The problem with serving these
interests, however, is that they inhibit the flow of communication to the public
regarding the quality of their elected officials at the point in time when this
information is most needed. 96
Applying a first amendment balancing test, the question is whether the public's
right to know combined with attorneys' right to free speech outweighs state interests
that are not compelling or significant. Attorneys have a right to comment freely on
the qualifications and standards of their profession. Their experience makes them
90. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
91. Id. at 77-78.
92. Eisenberg v. Boardman, 302 F. Supp. 1360, 1362 (W.D. Wis. 1969) (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
93. ABA CODE, supra note 2, DR 8-102. This rule states:
(A) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false statements of fact concerning the qualifications of a candidate for
election or appointment to a judicial office.
(B) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations against a judge or other adjudicatory officer.
Id.
94. See In re Humphrey, 174 Cal, 290, 163 P. 60 (1917); State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1958); In re
Baker, 218 Kan. 209, 542 P.2d 701 (1975); In re Raggio, 87 Nev. 369, 487 P.2d 499 (1971); In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D.
191, 75 N.W.2d 644 (1956); Board of Law Examiners v. Spriggs, 61 Wyo. 70, 155 P.2d 285, cert. denied, 325 U.S.
886 (1945). But see Thatcher v. United States, 212 F. 801 (6th Cir. 1914), reh'g denied, 219 F. 173 (6th Cir. 1915),
appeal dismissed, 241 U.S. 644 (1916); Eisenberg v. Boardman, 302 F. Supp. 1360 (,v.D. Wis. 1969); State v. Russell,
227 Kan. 897, 610 P.2d 1122, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Lewis, 282 S.W.2d 321
(Ky. 1955); In re Donohoe, 90 Wash. 2d 173, 580 P.2d 1093 (1978).
95. In re Baker, 218 Kan. 209, 542 P.2d 701 (1975); Board of Law Examiners v. Spriggs, 155 P.2d 285 (Wyo.
1945); CJC Canon 7(B)(1)(c).
96. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
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knowledgeable about the workings of the profession. Their publicized concern with
what they believe to be problems in the legal system provides the public with
invaluable criticism.
The public's right to know also is implicated when attorney speech is restricted
during election campaigns. "The public is affected greatly by the conduct and quality
of lawyers and judges. It has an interest, therefore, in being informed about problems
in the legal system." 97 The right to know is a right to receive information
communicated by another person. This right has been recognized by the United States
Supreme Court and "is important not only for truthseeking and collective
decisionmaking but also for effectuating social change without violence or coer-
cion." 98
B. State Court Standards Restricting Attorney Criticism of Judges
The standards governing attorney conduct are established by each state.
However, most states have adopted the ABA Code in full or with minor revisions. 99
Regardless, the application of the same rule in different states has resulted in very
different outcomes. In addition, the rights and duties required by the ABA Code often
result in conflicting obligations within a single proceeding.
The disciplinary rule governing EC 8-6 requires that attorneys have knowledge
of the falsity of their criticisms before they can be sanctioned. 100 However, several
cases involving EC 8-6 have applied a standard lower than knowingly false in
sanctioning attorney speech. o EC 8-6 substantially dilutes the protection of DR's
8-102(A) and (B) stating that although a "lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize
[judges and administrative officials] publicly, he should be certain of the merit of his
complaint, use appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and
intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in our legal system."' 0 2
Other courts have applied the New York Times malice standard.' 0 3
It is established that an attorney candidate for judicial election may criticize the
incumbent.' °4  EC 8-6 requires that "[1]awyers should protest earnestly
97. Note, supra note 17, at 501.
98. Id. at 502 (citing Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 2. See generally
id.; Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEo.
L.J. 775 (1975). For cases that have recognized the right to know, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) ("people will perceive their own best interests only if they are well
enough informed"); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408m-09 (1974) (prisoners' right to receive mail); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (right of citizens to obtain information of public concern through
the media).
99. See Note, Lmvyer Disciplinary Standards: Broad vs. Narrow Proscriptions, supra note 40, at 1386, 1387.
10p. ABA CODE, supra note 2, DR 8-102. For a statement of DR 8-102, see supra note 93. See also Polk v. State
Bar, 374 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Justices of the Appellate Div. v. Erdmann, 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d 426,
347 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1973) (mem.), rev'g 39 A.D.2d 223, 333 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1972); State Bar v. Semaan, 508 S.W.2d
429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
101. Note, supra note 17, at 495-97.
102. ABA CoDE, supra note 2, EC 8-6.
103. See Eisenberg v. Boardman, 302 F. Supp. 1360 (W.D. Wis. 1969); State v. Russell, 227 Kan. 897, 903-04,
610 P.2d 1122, 1127-28 (1980); State Bar v. Semaan, 508 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
104. See, e.g., Thatcher v. United States, 212 F. 801, 807 (6th Cir. 1914), reh'g denied, 219 F. 173 (6th Cir. 1915),
appeal dismissed, 241 U.S. 644 (1916); In re Baker, 218 Kan. 209, 214, 542 P.2d 701, 706 (1975); In re Gorsuch, 76
S.D. 191, 197-98, 75 N.W.2d 644, 648 (1956); In re Donohoe, 90 Wash. 2d 173, 181, 580 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1978).
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against.., those who are unsuited for the bench . ,,.15 However, this right to
criticize has been construed narrowly against the speaker with the result that attorneys
often speak at their peril during election campaigns. As one commentator has pointed
out, "[a]llowing an attorney to evoke the first amendment but then requiring him to
face possible disbarment as a penalty for doing so affords no real protection."'06 Fear
of sanctions may severely limit public debate during judicial election campaigns,
thereby infringing upon the voter's right to make an informed choice.
Courts often require attorneys to be certain that their statements are true. A mere
good-faith belief in a statement that is ultimately determined to be false or
misleading has been grounds for the imposition of sanctions. 10 7 Statements of opinion
are often difficult to prove true or false. However, courts that narrowly construe the
ABA Code do not appear to make any distinction between a factually verifiable
statement and a subjective expression of opinion. 108
However, "the American people as a whole are politically mature and have had
much experience in weighing statements made in an election campaign. The name
calling, the unfair charges, the innuendoes and the destructive criticisms so
characteristic of an election contest are not taken too seriously by the voters." 109 The
voters, therefore, should be able to receive freely the good-faith opinions of lawyers
regarding judicial candidates. They then can make individual choices based on all of
the available information. Making judicial elections a relatively open process informs
the public. Restricting the flow of information-even damaging information-to
keep the public ignorant is not a constitutionally permissible reason to restrict
attorney speech." 0 As Mr. Justice Brandeis stated, "If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."" '
C. State Court Standards Limiting Speech by Judges and Candidates in Election
Campaigns
Two cases, Morial v. Judiciary Commission"2 and Berger v. Supreme Court,1 3
105. ABA CODE, supra note 2, EC 8-6.
106. Chapman, supra note 37, at 445.
107. See State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 609 (Fla. 1958); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165,
168 (Ky. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Lewis, 282 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Ky.
1955). See also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
108. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Ky. 1980) (attorney publicly criticized judge's
action as highly unethical and grossly unfair), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Nail, 599
S.W.2d 899, 899 (Ky. 1980) (attorney described proceeding before a hearing officer of an administrative body as a "mere
farce" and a "Kangaroo Court"); In re Raggio, 87 Nev. 369, 371, 487 P.2d 499, 500 (1971) (attorney criticized court's
opinion as a "most shocking . . . example of judicial legislation at its very worst"). But see State v. Russell, 227 Kan.
897, 903, 610 P.2d 1122, 1127 (false statements in bad taste that are largely political rhetoric cannot be the basis for
discipline), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980); Justices of the Appellate Div. v. Erdmann, 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d
426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1973) (mem.) (attorney's degrading, vulgar criticism of the law and courts not subject to
sanction), rev'g 39 A.D.2d 223, 333 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1972).
109. In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191, 199, 75 N.W.2d 644, 649 (1956).
110. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977).
111. Id. at 97 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
112. 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
113. 598 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
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involved preconduct challenges to the CJC. Because there was an actual threat of
prosecution for the proposed activity in both cases, preconduct challenges to the
validity of laws infringing first amendment rights were appropriate. In neither
case was the CJC found to be facially unconstitutional. However, the cases
reveal the serious problems involved in the CJC restrictions imposed on judicial
candidates.
1. Morial v. Judiciary Commission
Morial involved a challenge to CJC Canon 7(A)(3), which requires judges to
resign their position before announcing their candidacy for nonjudicial office. 114
Morial, a state appellate court judge, was interested in becoming a nonparty candidate
for Mayor of New Orleans. His request for a leave of absence to run for mayor was
denied unanimously by both the Louisiana Supreme Court and that court's Committee
on Judicial Ethics. 1 5 Morial and thirteen of his supporters then filed suit in Federal
District Court challenging Canon 7(A)(3) as violating their first amendment rights of
free speech and association and their fourteenth amendment right to equal protec-
tion. 116
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted the
plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that Canon 7(A)(3) created a
chilling effect on the first amendment rights of Morial and his supporters."t 7 Because
Louisiana had chosen to elect its judges, the court held it could not treat judge-
candidates differently from any other candidates. Consequently, judge-candidates
have the rights of expression and association which are inherent in the right to run for
public office." t8 The activities necessary to candidacy include the rights to publicly
debate and to advocate viewpoints on political issues."t 9 Morial's supporters'
constitutional rights were violated because the Canon infringed on their rights to vote
and to associate.12 0 The associational rights of Morial's supporters included the right
to support their chosen candidate and the right to hear that candidate's views.'12 The
freedom to associate includes the right of people to form a group and support a
114. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978). CJC,
supra note 20, Canon 7(A)(3) provides:
A judge should resign his office when he becomes a candidate either in a party primary or in a general election
for non-judicial office, except that he may continue to hold his judicial office while being a candidate for
election to or serving as a delegate in a state constitutional convention, if he is otherwise permitted by law to
do so.
Id.
115. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
116. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 438 F. Supp. 599, 605 (E.D. La.), rev'd, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
117. Id. at 608.
118. Id. See, e.g., William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
119. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 438 F. Supp. 599, 608 (E.D. La.), rev'd, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
120. Id. at 609. See, e.g., Reed v. Giarrusso, 462 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1972); Moore v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 435
(S.D. Ala. 1964).
121. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 438 F. Supp. 599, 608-09 (E.D. La.), rev'd, 565 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
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candidate. The court in Morial found that these rights are necessary to make
individuals' freedom of expression effective. 22
Because the court in Morial held that CJC Canon 7(A)(3) infringed upon
plaintiffs' fundamental rights of expression and association, the burden of proof
shifted to the state to show a compelling governmental interest in the restrictions.1
2 3
The court agreed that avoiding actual impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
on the part of judges are compelling interests. 24 However, the court ruled that the
Canon, which was not imposed on other public officials, was not a necessary or even
a reasonably necessary means by which to achieve that goal.' 2 5 The state failed to
show that campaigns have an inherently corrupting influence on candidates or that
campaign conduct affects judges' ethics or citizens' respect for the judiciary. 126 The
court concluded:
[Tlhe State's policy is hypocritical. It requires a Judge to be constantly seasoned in the
political process, and then seeks to gloss over this political exposure by the thin facade of
the Canon... which [is] designed to give the public the idea that even though Judges are
elected, that they are not necessarily required to engage in politics at election time.27
The district court's decision in favor of the plaintiffs was reversed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.128 The Fifth Circuit did not question the
plaintiffs' standing or the ability of the district court to decide the constitutional
issues. 29 The court, however, adopted the view that the state has the power to impose
broad restrictions on the political activities of federal and state civil servants, and this
power extends to the activities of a public official.' 30 Further, the court refused to
recognize the right to candidacy as fundamental.' 3' Therefore, the Canon's restric-
tions were valid only if they were reasonably necessary to achieve a compelling
public objective.' 3 2 Notably, this standard is lower than the standard the district court
applied which required the state to prove that the restrictions were actually necessary
to achieve the compelling state interest.1 3' The Fifth Circuit first addressed the
plaintiffs' interests. Morial's interest in being free to run for nonjudicial office, while
important, was not a fundamental right. The court stated that "candidacy for office is
one of the ultimate forms of political expression in our society,"'134 but decided that
122. Id. at 609.
123. Id. at 611.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 612.
127. Id. at 606.
128. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
129. Id.
130. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295,300 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978). The Fifth
Circuit relied on the Hatch Act cases. E.g., United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (the Court specifically approved restrictions on the rights
of federal and state civil servants to be candidates for public office). The Fifth Circuit applied the reasoning of these cases
to sitting judges. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
131. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978). See also
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-44 (1972).
132, Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
134. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
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Morial had other means through which he could exercise his political beliefs. He
could vote or make public statements outside the campaign context.135 The
resignation requirement was found to have even less of an impact on voters because
no identifiable group or viewpoint was excluded from the electoral process. 136
On the other hand, the state contended that important interests were served by
insuring the impartiality of the judiciary:
The specific evils targeted are three. First, the state wishes to prevent abuse of the judicial
office by a judge-candidate during the course of the campaign. The state also wishes to
prevent abuse of the judicial office by judges who have lost their electoral bids and
returned to the bench. Finally, Louisiana asserts an interest in eliminating even the
appearance of impropriety by judges .... 137
Because the Canon only had to be reasonably necessary to achieve the
compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the judiciary, the state was not
required to show that any of the asserted evils it sought to avoid were likely results
of the plaintiff's proposed candidacy. 138 Conversely, the district court, which applied
a much higher level of scrutiny, found the state's asserted interests unpersuasive
because the state produced no evidence relating to lack of judicial integrity in political
campaigns.1 39 The district court's more penetrating analysis also found that these
interests could be served through means less restrictive of speech. 140
The result of the application of different levels of scrutiny by the district court
and the court of appeals in Morial is illuminating. By applying a lower level of
scrutiny, the court of appeals considerably reduced the judge's first amendment
rights. The district court, however, was convinced that the degree of speech
restriction sanctioned in Morial can be justified only when the dangers of allowing the
speech are proven and no reasonable alternatives less restrictive of speech exist.' 41
2. Berger v. Supreme Court
Berger v. Supreme Court'42 involved a preconduct challenge to Canon
7(B)(1)(c) of the CJC on the ground that it violated Berger's first amendment rights.
Canon 7(B)(1)(c) prohibits a candidate for judicial office from making promises "of
conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office."1 43 Berger, a candidate for the office of Judge of the Cuyahoga County Court
of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, wanted to discuss his views
publicly and to make certain pledges and promises regarding reform in the Domestic
135. Id.
136. Id. at 301-02. But see Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (exclusion of poor); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S.
346 (1970) (exclusion of blacks); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (exclusion of new political parties).
137. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
138. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 48-87.
139. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 438 F. Supp. 599, 611-12 (E.D. La.), rev'd, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
140. Id. at 611.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 123-27.
142. 598 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
143. CJC, supra note 20, Canon 7(B)(I)(c).
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Relations Division.144 Berger also wanted to criticize the administration of domestic
relations law, especially the excessive use of trial referees by the court.145
Berger's preconduct challenge was based in part on a disciplinary proceeding
against a judicial candidate pending in the Supreme Court of Ohio. 146 The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio accepted Berger's argument on
standing, namely that statements by Ohio's Disciplinary Counsel created an actual
threat of prosecution should Berger proceed to make his proposed comments. 147 Ohio
Disciplinary Counsel, Anthony Gagliardo, had made clear his view that Canon
7(B)(1)(c) prohibits candidates for judicial office "from making comments that are
critical of the incumbent, regardless of the truth or falsity of those allegations."' 148
Although the court agreed with Berger that there was a sufficient threat to his
first amendment rights to grant him standing, the court did not accept Berger's
argument that 7(B)(1)(c) had a chilling effect on his right to free speech. Instead, the
court interpreted Canon 7(B)(1)(c), contrary to the Disciplinary Counsel's position,
as allowing criticism of an incumbent that is not false or misleading and thus found
it unnecessary to grant injunctive relief.' 49 Therefore, until the Supreme Court of
Ohio authoritatively speaks on the issue, Canon 7(B)(1)(c) as interpreted by the
Berger court is facially constitutional in Ohio.
The reading of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) employed by the district court appears to be a
warning to Ohio's Disciplinary Counsel. The Counsel's interpretation of the Canon
was disregarded by the court because only the supreme court of the state has the
power to conclusively interpret the CJC.150 Moreover, the court did not appear to
accept the constitutionality of an interpretation of the Canon that would prohibit all
statements critical of an incumbent judge.i s '
IV. A PROPOSED STANDARD OF CAMPAIGN CONDUCr LESS RESTRICTIVE OF FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Courts traditionally have construed the ABA Code as allowing attorneys much
less latitude for criticism than is allowed nonattorneys during judicial election
campaigns. 152 For example, a nonattorney may negligently make false statements
about a candidate, whereas an attorney is subject to possible sanction for making such
statements. These restrictions on attorneys' speech are said to be essential to preserve
the integrity and independence of the judiciary and to maintain public confidence in
the legal system. 13 The effect of these restrictions is to insulate the judiciary from
criticism by its most qualified critics. The conflict between judicial norms and
144. Berger v. Supreme Court, 598 F. Supp. 69, 72 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 73-74. See also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (the threat of prosecution is enough to present
a justiciable controversy).
148. Berger v. Supreme Court, 598 F. Supp. 69, 73 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
149. Id. at 75.
150. Id.
151. Id. See also In re Baker, 218 Kan. 209, 542 P.2d 701 (1975).
152. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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political reality often results in unnecessary infringement on attorney speech and an
underinformed electorate.
A more effective balance between the first amendment interests of attorneys and
the public on the one hand and the need to maintain confidence in the legal system
on the other hand must be established. This goal can be effected by applying the New
York Times rule 154 to attorney and judicial speech during election campaigns. The
United States Supreme Court in Garrison v. Louisianat'5 explained how this rule
should be applied to comments about judges:
The reasonable-belief standard ... is not the same as the reckless-disregard-of-truth
standard.... [A] reasonable belief is one which "an ordinary prudent man might be able
to assign a just and fair reason for";... the immunity from . . . responsibility in the
absence of ill-will disappears on proof that the exercise of ordinary care would have
revealed that the statement was false. The test which we laid down in New York Times is
not keyed to ordinary care; defeasance of the privilege is conditioned, not on mere
negligence, but on reckless disregard for the truth. 156
It is especially important to protect as much open debate as possible during a
judicial election campaign when the need for discussion of issues is at its peak. 157
Two state court decisions have applied the New York Times rule outlined in Garrison
to attorneys' speech, thus balancing the need to maintain respect for the judiciary
against first amendment considerations. 5 8 Neither of these cases involved speech
during election campaigns; however, the context of an election campaign only
strengthens the argument for applying the New York Times rule.
In Eisenberg v. Boardman,5 9 two attorneys brought an action in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin to enjoin a state court
disciplinary proceeding brought against them.' 60 They argued that the Wisconsin
statute requiring attorneys to take an oath to maintain the respect due the courts and
judicial officers violated their first amendment speech rights.'61 The complaint in the
disciplinary proceeding alleged that the "defendants... pursued a course of
vindictive and reckless harassment" 62 against a judge which resulted in his suicide.
The court rejected the first amendment challenge because the Wisconsin Supreme
Court had applied the New York Times rule in its interpretations of the statute.' 63
Thus, the malice standard was applied to attorneys in Wisconsin on the same terms
as other citizens for statements made outside the courtroom.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
155. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
156. Id. at 79. See also supra text accompanying notes 82-92.
157. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392-93 (1962). See also supra text accompanying notes 75-81.
158. See Eisenberg v. Boardman, 302 F. Supp. 1360 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Justices of the Appellate Div. v. Erdmann,
33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1973) (mem.), rev'g 39 A.D.2d 223, 333 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1972).
159. 302 F. Supp. 1360 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
160. Id. at 1361.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1362-63 & n.3. See also In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 409, 240 N.W. 441, 455 (1932) (An attorney has
a right to make public utterances seeking to correct abuses, or what he believes to be abuses, on the part of the judiciary.
"It best conforms to the spirit of our institutions to permit everyone to say what he will about courts, and leave the destiny
of the courts to the good judgment of the people.").
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Addressing the danger of engendering disrespect for the judiciary, the court
found that the state's interest was outweighed by the interests of the attorneys and the
public. The court refused to analyze the motives of the attorneys, preferring to rely
on the "combined sober judgment of the voters . . . in the long run to protect the
courts from calumny, abuse, and unfounded criticism."' 16 4 In Eisenberg, the balance
between the state's interest in maintaining respect for the judiciary was outweighed
by the attorney's right to free speech because the state's interest was promoted rather
than impaired by disseminating information to the public. Presumably, the court
relied on the theory that the most effective manner in which truth is ascertained is to
allow free criticism of candidates and an opportunity for rebuttal.
The Court of Appeals of New York also applied the New York Times rule in
Justices of the Appellate Division v. Erdmann.165 The Court of Appeals reversed the
Appellate Division, which found that Erdmann's statements offended the dignity and
integrity of the courts, tended to create disrespect for judicial officers generally, and
lessened public confidence in the legal system. 66 In a memorandum decision, the
Court of Appeals found that "[w]ithout more, isolated instances of disrespect for the
law, Judges and courts expressed by vulgar or insulting words... are not subject to
professional discipline." 167 Erdmann's opinions, although tasteless, would be
interpreted by the public as an attorney's personal opinion as opposed to an
authoritative factual conclusion.
In formulating a new standard for attorney speech in judicial election campaigns,
it must be kept in mind that a restriction on free speech can survive judicial scrutiny
under the first amendment only if certain fundamental conditions are met. First, the
limitation must "further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated
to the suppression of expression." 168 Second, the restriction must be "no greater than
is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved.' ' 169 The court must weigh the gravity and the probability of the harm
caused by freely allowing the expression against the extent to which free speech rights
would be inhibited by suppressing the speech. 170
When the state interest is the effective administration of justice, the speech must
present a clear and present danger to the administration of justice before it can be
punished. 171 Some courts apply this standard to extrajudicial statements by attor-
164. Eisenberg v. Boardman, 302 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 (V.D. Wis. 1969) (quoting In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374,
409, 240 N.W. 441, 455 (1932)).
165. 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1973) (mem.), rev'g39 A.D.2d 223, 333 N.Y.S.2d 863
(1972). Mr. Erdmann, in an article published in Life magazine, was quoted as saying of New York's First Judicial
Department: "There are so few trial judges who just judge, who rule on questions of law, and leave guilt or innocence
to the jury. And Appellate Division judges aren't any better. They're the whores who became madams." Id. at 560, 301
N.E.2d at 426, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 442 (1973) (Burke, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 559, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 441, 301 N.E.2d at 427 (majority opinion).
167. Id.
168. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
169. Id.
170. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976) (citing United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
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neys.172 Other courts, applying the ABA Code, have upheld abridgements of attorney
speech by requiring the state to show only that the speech is reasonably likely to
interfere with the administration of justice. 173 This latter standard lowers the level of
judicial scrutiny and results in acceptance of any plausible state interest. 174 Under this
statement, the state is not required to show that the restriction on speech is not any
greater than necessary to serve the legitimate state interest. 175
A better standard would require the state to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that an attorney's speech actually impaired an important or compelling
governmental interest. 176 The court in Polk v. State Bar177 utilized this stricter
standard requiring a showing that a significant interest was actually impaired be-
fore the state could regulate an attorney's free speech rights under the guise of
prohibiting professional misconduct.178 To show a significant state interest, the state
had to prove that the attorney was incompetent or dishonest or that the attorney's
conduct affected the administration of justice. 179 Interestingly, the court defined
conduct affecting the administration of justice as "bribery of jurors, subornation of
perjury, [and] misrepresentation to a court."' 180 By requiring the state to prove that
the actual effect of the criticism was harmful, the Polk court rejected restrictions
which define "maintaining respect for the legal system" amorphously and which
thus violate an attorney's free speech rights without showing an adequate
countervailing state interest. Even if courts refuse to require the state to show a
compelling interest, the decision in Polk demonstrates that requiring an actual
showing of harm to a significant state interest can better protect an attorney's first
amendment rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Attorneys and judges are subject to sanctions for expressing criticisms of the
courts, laws, and judges. The standards used to impose these sanctions vary from state
to state. The standards most restrictive of speech discipline attorneys for comments
that are not "wellfounded, on a high plane, factual, and not personal."' 181 This duty
is imposed on attorneys to maintain public respect for the courts "not for the sake of
172. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Marcano Garcia, 456 F. Supp. 1354 (D.P.R. 1978).
173. See Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978); In re
Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 449 A.2d 483 (1982).
174. Compare Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978) with
Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 438 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. La.), rev'd, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1013 (1978).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 123-41.
176. See, e.g., Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 438 F. Supp. 599, 611 (E.D. La.), rev'd, 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
177. 374 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
178. Id. at 788.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. In re Donohoe, 90 Wash. 2d 173, 181, 580 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1978) (quoting R. \VI5E, L AL. Ermcs 21
(1966)).
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the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." 182
Under this standard, the rights of attorneys are different from other citizens. The
Supreme Court of Nevada described the duty of an attorney to the courts and judicial
officers:
We are never surprised when persons, not intimately involved with the administration of
justice, speak out in anger or frustration about our work and the manner in which we
perform it, and shall protect their right to so express themselves. A member of the bar,
however, stands in a different position by reason of his oath of office and the standards
of conduct which he is sworn to uphold. 83
This standard views the maintenance of the integrity of the judicial system as
outweighing all but the most innocuous statements by attorneys.
A better standard, applied by some courts, is the New York Times rule. 184 This
standard allows attorneys to express their opinions freely without fear of sanctions.
The courts should not seek to regulate attorney speech on the basis of taste, civility,
or morality. Sanctions are appropriate only when statements are malicious or when
they present an actual clear and present danger to the administration of justice.185
Judges and candidates for judicial office should have the same free speech rights
as other attorneys and elected officials. If attorneys are given greater freedom to
criticize judges and the courts, judges likewise should be free to respond to criticism
and to defend their records.1 86 Opening up the judicial election process will not only
protect the right to politicial expression for members of the bar and judiciary, but also
will produce a more informed electorate and thus a more enlightened electoral
process.
Elizabeth I. Kiovsky
182. Board of Law Examiners v. Spriggs, 61 Wyo. 70, 81, 155 P.2d 285, 289, cert. denied, 325 U.S. 886 (1945).
183. In re Raggio, 87 Nev. 369, 372, 487 P.2d 499, 500 (1971).
184. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 49-98.
186. See In re Baker, 218 Kan. 209, 542 P.2d 701 (1975).
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